Why does nepotism exist, in what sectors, to what extent and to what extent should it be allowed or not? This article aims to answer these questions by reviewing the available literature and developing an exploratory exercise for the case of the Mexican government.
For the author Leslie Holmes, nepotism implies “appointing family members” in public positions (Holmes, 2012). It places it within a category called “social inaccuracies” or traditional corruption; In it, he points out that it is accompanied by cronyism or, what is equivalent, hiring friends and colleagues in these positions.
For his part, Julio Ríos Figueroa defines nepotism as “the practice of support or concessions to individuals related to public goods or jobs based on family relationships and not on merit” (2018). The author makes evident the importance of talking about merit since nepotism constitutes the opposite pole. Although the career civil service has helped encourage those who hold public office to do so for their knowledge, talent and skills, the reality is that officials continue to be hired just because they belong to a public servant’s family or group of friends. Ríos also refers to another category called “patronage”: “an instrumental relationship in which an individual of higher status (patron) uses his influence and resources to grant a public position to an individual of lower status who, in turn, pays offering support and assistance, including personal services that benefit the employer (Stokes, 2009)”.
The common element between the concepts of cronyism, patronage, nepotism, and other relationships such as compadrazgo or affinity, is the hiring of people with blood or personal relationships in public positions. This employment relationship is not based on merit but on links with those who already hold public office.
Various studies have found that there are beneficial consequences of nepotism for organizations. For example, the learning curve is shorter; there is greater loyalty, and lower risks (Molofsky, 1998). There are stable relationships with contractors and a greater long-term commitment (Nelton, 1998). Finally, the communication of the rules and their application is clearer and fairer (Aronoff, Ward, 1993). In addition, a policy of unrestricted sanctions against nepotism directly can be counterproductive. There is evidence that women suffer the consequences of combating this problem, which accentuates gender inequality.
For example, when in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s a couple was discovered working in the same institution, the last one to enter, who was usually the woman, was fired (Asma, 2013; Podgers, 1986, Ríos Figueroa, 2018 ). In fact, the literature reviewed in the legal framework to combat nepotism is only linked to cases of marriages where wives are more affected (Vinton, 1998) and not to other expressions of nepotism with different degrees of affinity. The consequence, these studies highlight, is that women decide not to marry in order to secure their employment in a certain organization.
With the development of societies, the distribution of work and the specialization of people, this practice has been distorted according to the goals pursued by the domestic units that practice it. In contemporary capitalist societies, nepotism is common and even necessary in micro and small businesses in order to prosper efficiently. However, it is counterproductive in large companies, government organizations and unions.
In these institutions it has negative effects on morale, productivity and even damages the legitimacy on which an organization rests. One of these effects is when the members who collaborate in an institution stop supporting it by observing personal or family preferences in new hires (Ford, McLaughlin, 1985). This generates that the loyalties of the officials go in opposite directions to those of the organization itself. In the public sector, it affects the objectivity and neutrality of officials for decision making. In this way, the activities, components, purposes and ends of organizations are undermined because family networks have other objectives.
What configures this activity as a problem are its purposes and its consequences: the possibility that the objective of the organization is diverted to attend to the particular interests of a group, particularly of the relatives themselves. Julio Ríos talks about the nepotism that occurs through family networks, which are nothing more than relationships in which there are more than two individuals from the same family working in a certain organization. These networks are formed with two purposes: the first is to distribute public positions to family members out of loyalty, for financial support or to receive a possible reward.
The second purpose goes further. It occurs when these networks are formed to intervene in decision-making, in the exchange of favors or in important resolutions of internal conflicts. It is, in itself, an attempt to influence the system, which can lead to modifying the representativeness of collective interests, of the organization, or of the citizenry in general. Simply put, it’s capturing posts and budgets.
So far there are three possible ways to identify nepotism. The first is conducting surveys within the organization on the perception of the prevalence of family networks and cronyism. Its greatest bias occurs when the respondents are unaware of the existence of the networks or, where appropriate, when the relatives of the respondent work in the same organizational structure and deny them. The second route is designed for specific cases in which the object of investigation is a single network of nepotism. It implies knowing something more than the names and surnames of the officials of a certain organization.
This route implies carrying out a journalistic investigation to define, through other sources, blood and affinity relationships in all their degrees in order to be able to point them out. Then there is the third way, which is used for multiple objects of study that include thousands of observations or units of analysis. Its operationalization is also simpler, but its limits are decisive. This option indicates that it is necessary to evaluate the frequency in which the same surnames appear within an organization and contrast it with that proportion in a random sample of the population, in addition to locating it in a specific geographical area.
For example, a study by Stefano Allesina looked at 61,340 Italian academics for nepotism in higher education institutions in the country. Their findings were that there were two types of nepotism: concentrated (one family with many members in one institution) and diffuse (many families with few members in different institutions). In an attempt to replicate Allesina’s analysis, an exploration of those who make up the Secretaries of Public Function (SFP) and Welfare of the current federal public administration was carried out with data from the first semester of 2020. Some limitations must be pointed out: in First of all, it is difficult for the civil registry to provide information on people and their area of residence. These data would help identify concentrated nepotism. If diffuse nepotism is present, more information is needed for it to be statistically significant.
